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 I. INTRODUCTION  
Legal scholars frequently refer to Title VII protections for LGBT 
individuals. However, their examples and legal theories invariably focus 
on protections for lesbian, gay, and transgender individuals to the 
exclusion of bisexual individuals.1 The three Title VII cases heard by the 
Supreme Court on October 8, 2019, are illustrative of this point. Two 
involve the issue of discrimination against a gay employee (Bostock v. 
Clayton County and Altitude Express v. Zarda),2 and the other involves 
discrimination against a transsexual employee (R.G. & G.R. Harris 
Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).3 In 
the two hours of oral arguments for these three cases, the word “bisexual” 
was never mentioned. Even the acronym “LGBT”—in which the “B” 
stands for bisexuals—was never mentioned. The petitioner’s attorney in 
Bostock explicitly disagreed with interpreting Title VII to “encompass 
sexual orientation discrimination.”4 
Despite claims that a Supreme Court decision in favor of Bostock 
would provide protections to employees discriminated against based on 
their sexual orientation, an evaluation of the arguments in Bostock casts 
serious doubt on how they would affect a future case involving a similarly 
 
1 See, e.g., Ronald Turner, Title VII and the Unenvisaged Case: Is Anti-LGBTQ 
Discrimination Unlawful Sex Discrimination?, 95 IND. L.J. 227 (2020). “[T]he question 
posed in this Article [is]: Is anti-LGBTQ discrimination prohibited by Title VII’s 
discrimination ‘because of sex’ proscription?” Id. at 268. However, the only time Turner’s 
Article makes reference to bisexuality is in footnotes defining the acronym LGBT. Id. at 
229 n.14, 254, n.202. In conducting research for this Article, this author did not see a single 
example in any law review article of how Title VII might affect a bisexual claimant. 
2 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., No. 17-13801 (U.S. docketed June 1, 2018); Altitude 
Express v. Zarda, No. 15-3775 (U.S. docketed June 1, 2018). The two cases have been 
consolidated. 
3 R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, No. 
16-2424 (U.S. docketed July 24, 2018). 
4 Oral Argument at 3:44, Bostock, No. 17-13801, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/17-
1618. After explicitly disagreeing with interpreting Title VII to “encompass sexual 
orientation discrimination,” the petitioner’s attorney presented the following sex-based 
Title VII standard—which clearly applies to gays and lesbians but not necessarily to 
bisexuals: 
Title VII was intended to make sure that men were not disadvantaged 
relative to women and women were not disadvantaged relative to men. 
And when you tell two employees who come in both of whom tell you 
they married their partner Bill last weekend, when you fire the male 
employee who married Bill and give the female employee who married 
Bill a couple of days off to celebrate the joyous event that’s 
discrimination because of sex. 
Id. at 4:15. 
2020] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW 35 
 
situated bisexual plaintiff.5 Part II of this Article looks at the relevant 
history of bisexuality, in particular their treatment in society and under the 
law when compared to heterosexuals and homosexuals. Part III provides 
an overview of the relevant Title VII history. The remainder of the Article 
evaluates the three arguments presented by petitioners in Bostock in favor 
of extending Title VII protections to gay and lesbian individuals, and 
assesses their likely effectiveness when applied to protecting bisexual 
individuals from employment discrimination. Part IV covers 
discrimination “because of . . . sex.”6 Part V covers Price Waterhouse 
gender stereotyping,7 and Part VI covers claims of associational 
discrimination.8 It is the aim of this Article to present the arguments in a 
neutral manner, rather than engaging in advocacy for a personally desired 
outcome. 
II. RELEVANT BISEXUAL HISTORY 
This section presents the historical context for treatment of bisexual 
individuals by—and compared to—heterosexuals and homosexuals, and 
how this results in bisexual erasure. This includes analysis of how 
bisexuals are treated by society in general and how they are treated under 
the law. 
Despite being more than half of all LGBT individuals in the United 
States, 9 bisexual individuals have a long history of being ignored, even by 
fellow LGBT advocates.10 The first national gay rights organization was 
founded in 1951.11 The first national lesbian rights organization was 
founded in 1955.12 It was not until 1983 that the first bisexual political 
organization was formed.13 During the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, 
 
5 While the term is somewhat amorphous, for the purposes of this Article, the term 
“bisexual” is defined as “of, relating to, or characterized by a tendency to be sexually 
attracted toward individuals of both sexes . . ..” See infra note 104. 
6 Brief for Petitioner at 13, Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 17-13801 (2018). 
7 Id. at 17, 27. 
8 Id. at 19. 
9 GLAAD, REPORTING ON THE BISEXUAL COMMUNITY: A RESOURCE FOR JOURNALISTS 
AND MEDIA PROFESSIONALS 9 (2016), https://www.glaad.org/sites/default/files/Bi
MediaResourceGuide.pdf. 
10 Id. (“Despite making up a large portion of the LGBT community, the bisexual 
community and the issues bi people face are often under- and misreported.”) 
11 The American Gay Rights Movement: A Timeline, INFOPLEASE, 
https://www.infoplease.com/history/pride-month/the-american-gay-rights-movement-a-
timeline (last updated Feb. 11, 2017). 
12 Id. 
13 Miranda Rosenblum, The U.S. Bisexual+ Movement: A #BiWeek History Lesson, 
GLAAD (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.glaad.org/blog/us-bisexual-movement-biweek-
history-lesson. 
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bisexual men were portrayed as “the ultimate pariahs.”14 Bisexual 
individuals are often mislabeled as either gay or lesbian, and their 
historical contributions to the LGBT movement are often overlooked.15 
Out of the $487 million provided to LGBT programs and organizations 
from 1970 to 2010, only $84,000 went to organizations that specifically 
serve the bisexual community.16 Bisexual individuals are vastly 
underreported in media coverage. The ratio of references to 
“homosexuality” and “bisexuality” in major newspapers is greater than 
20:1, despite bisexual individuals making up most of the LGBT 
community.17 
Bisexual erasure is described as “the lack of acknowledgment and 
ignoring of the clear evidence that bisexuals exist.”18 This, in turn, leads 
to bisexual invisibility. It is posited that bisexual erasure is the result of a 
shared interest from both heterosexuals and homosexuals to suppress 
bisexuality.19 In the seminal work on the subject, three interests for 
bisexual erasure shared by heterosexuals and homosexuals are defined as 
“(1) an interest in the stability of sexual orientation categories; (2) an 
interest in the primacy of sex as a diacritical characteristic; and (3) an 
interest in the preservation of monogamy.”20 
Bisexual erasure is likely an underlying cause for the poor health 
outcomes in the bisexual community.21 This is because bisexuality is 
rarely discussed—and therefore rarely understood—by medical 
professionals and researchers.22 As a result, the medical community lacks 
bi-inclusive resources on sexual health.23 Experts conclude that biphobia 
is likely responsible for lower rates of preventative care in bisexual 




16 Zachary Zane, In the LGBT Community, Bisexual People Have More Health Risks. 
Here’s What Could Help, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/soloish/wp/2017/09/25/in-the-lgbt-community-bisexual-people-have-
more-health-risks-heres-what-could-help/. 
17 Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 
368 (2000). 
18 Bisexual Erasure, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/accordionview/bisexual-erasure 
(last visited May 7, 2020). 
19 Yoshino, supra note 17, at 391–92. 
20 Id. at 399. 
21 Health Disparities Among Bisexual People, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., 




24 Id. (“Negative experiences in healthcare settings can lead bisexual people to delay 
health care visits, change healthcare providers, avoid disclosing their sexuality in 
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obesity.25 Biphobia is also likely responsible for disproportionate HIV 
rates in bisexual men due to less testing.26 
Despite relatively rapid advances in rights for gay and lesbian 
individuals, bisexual acceptance has not experienced the same growth.27 
Bisexual men and women experience poverty at higher rates than both 
their straight or gay counterparts.28 They are also more likely to be 
unemployed or have more mental health issues.29 Bisexual individuals are 
significantly less likely than gay and lesbian individuals to feel 
comfortable coming out as bisexual.30 Some even choose to identify as gay 
or lesbian to avoid discrimination and to avoid unpleasant conversations 
regarding bisexual skepticism.31 Bisexual individuals are more likely than 
gay and lesbian individuals to participate in self-harm, including suicide.32 
Sometimes bisexual individuals have to deal with the unpleasant 
undertaking of being confronted by people who deny the very existence of 
their sexual orientation.33 This challenge can even come from inside the 
LGBT community.34 The belief that bisexuality does not exist as a 




27 GLAAD, supra note 9, at 3 (“The past few years have seen a surge of acceptance for 
the LGBT community, but acceptance for bisexual people continues to lag behind.”). 
28 Shabab Ahmed Mirza, Disaggregating the Data for Bisexual People, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbtq-
rights/reports/2018/09/24/458472/disaggregating-data-bisexual-people/. 
29 Id. 
30 Ann E. Tweedy & Karen Yescavage, Employment Discrimination Against Bisexuals: 
An Empirical Study, 21 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 699, 704 (2015) (“[B]isexuals 
were less than half as likely as gays and lesbians to have told most or all of the important 
people in their lives about their sexual orientations, and a 2013 survey of employees in 
Britain revealed that bisexuals are only roughly one third as likely as gays and lesbians to 
feel comfortable being out in the workplace. And, this reluctance to come out contributes 
to feelings of dissatisfaction at work.”). 
31 Benoit Denizet-Lewis, The Scientific Quest to Prove Bisexuality Exists, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/magazine/the-
scientific-quest-to-prove-bisexuality-exists.html (giving the example of a bisexual man 
who chooses to identify as gay, who explains that “there are a host of emotional reasons 
why I choose to identify as gay. For one thing, it simplifies my life”). 
32 Health Disparities Among Bisexual People, supra note 21. 
33 Zachary Zane, Bisexual People Have Long Felt Excluded at Pride Festivities. 
That’s Finally Changing, WASH. POST (June 7, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2019/06/07/bisexual-people-
have-long-felt-excluded-pride-festivities-thats-finally-changing/ (providing the example 
of a bisexual man who attended a gay pride march and was harassed by gay men who 
asserted he would leave his girlfriend and come out as gay by the end of the day). 
34 Id. 
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legitimate sexual orientation is often rooted in the false notion that sexual 
orientation is binary—people are either homosexual or heterosexual.35 
Therefore, bisexual individuals are simply confused as to which of the two 
they are.36 Consistent with this binary view of sexual orientation, bisexual 
men report harassment from gay men regarding how they should quit 
riding the fence and come out as fully gay.37 It has been hypothesized that 
perhaps the reason bisexual individuals are viewed negatively by some gay 
and lesbian individuals is because they have the privilege of “passing” as 
straight.38 
A majority of bisexual individuals report being the victim of 
employment discrimination.39 The most common reason provided for why 
a bisexual employee did not file a complaint for the employment 
discrimination experienced was because they did not think they would get 
the assistance they needed.40 Unfortunately, this hopeless mindset is 
supported by research. A 2015 study found that out of all the electronically 
available employment discrimination case law, bisexual plaintiffs have yet 
to win a single case on the merits.41 Additionally, bisexual individuals are 
also disproportionately people of color.42 This results in an increased 
vulnerability to further disparities related to racism and biphobia.43 
Internet searches also demonstrate the different level of attention 
bisexual causes receive when compared to gay and lesbian causes. A 
Google search for “gay rights” returns more than nine times as many 
results as a search for “bisexual rights.”44 The disparity is even more 
35 GLAAD, supra note 9, at 4 (discussing a study about how bisexual people reported 
they “avoided coming out because they didn’t want to deal with misconceptions that 
bisexuals were indecisive or incapable of monogamy”). 
36 Id. 
37 Zane, supra note 33.
38 Id. (quoting Ian Lawrence-Tourinho, director of the American Institute of Bisexuality, 
who said, “So there’s a bit of resentment toward bi people because they still have a foot—
so to speak—in the straight world”). 
39 Tweedy & Yescavage, supra note 30, at 724. 
40 Id. at 735 (excluding the response of “other”). 
41 Id. at 717. 
42 Health Disparities Among Bisexual People, supra note 21. ("Moreover, 
(transgender people and people of color comprise large portions of the bisexual 
community – with more than 40 percent of LGBT people of color identifying as 
bisexual . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
43 Id. 
44 In Google searches performed on May 7, 2020, “Bisexual rights” 
returned approximately 93.5 million results, while “gay rights” returned approximately 
812 million results. Compare Bisexual Rights – Google Search, 
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search?q=bisexual+rights (last visited May 
14, 2020) [https://perma.cc/X3US-H5G9], with Gay Rights – Google 
Search, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search?q=gay+rights (last visited 
May 14, 2020) [https://perma.cc/BZK7-L5N2]. 
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severe in the area of law. Similarly, a Westlaw search for “gay rights” 
returns more than eighty times as many cases as a search for “bisexual 
rights.”45 
In addition to worse health outcomes, higher unemployment, less 
media coverage, and the burden of dealing with “double discrimination,”46 
including people who deny the very existence of bisexuality as a sexual 
orientation, bisexual individuals also face unequal treatment in the legal 
system. This often manifests in some form of not viewing bisexual 
individuals as legitimate members in the LGBT community. Relevant to 
the topic of Title VII protections, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s (EEOC) memo on “Enforcement Protections for LGBT 
Workers” provides an example of this practice. The memo lists numerous 
cases as examples illustrating the protections for LGBT workers.47 While 
these cases illustrate the protections for gay and transgender plaintiffs, 
none involve bisexual plaintiffs.48 In another EEOC memo that lists 
eighteen cases of “Recent EEOC Litigation Regarding Title VII & LGBT-
Related Discrimination,” lesbian, gay, and transgender plaintiffs are well 
represented; meanwhile, not a single case involving bisexual plaintiffs are 
provided.49 
An analysis of cases involving LGBT plaintiffs demonstrates that even 
in the legal system, bisexual individuals face misconceptions as to their 
sexual orientation—and challenges as to whether there exists a bisexual 
orientation. LGBT case law also demonstrates bisexual erasure by 
sometimes explicitly excluding bisexuals from LGBT consideration. 
Apilado v. North American Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance (NAGAAA) is 
a prominent case involving bisexual plaintiffs.50 It also illustrates the 
“double discrimination” experienced by bisexual individuals as it involves 
 
45 Searches of all federal courts were performed on May 15, 2020; “bisexual rights” 
returned four cases while “gay rights” returned 329 cases. Westlaw search for “bisexual 
rights” (May 15, 2020) (on file with author); Westlaw search for “gay rights” (May 15, 
2020) (on file with author). 
46 Double discrimination is when bisexuals are discriminated against by both 
heterosexuals and homosexuals. See Robyn Ochs, Biphobia: It Goes More Than Two Ways, 
https://robynochs.com/biphobia-it-goes-more-than-two-ways/ (last visited May 7, 2020). 
47 What You Should Know: The EEOC and the Enforcement Protections for LGBT 




49 Fact Sheet: Recent EEOC Litigation Regarding Title VII & LGBT-Related 
Discrimination, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (July 8, 2016), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/fact-sheet-recent-eeoc-litigation-regarding-title-vii-lgbt-related-
discrimination. 
50 Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic All., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (W.D. Wash. 
2011). 
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discrimination by gay individuals against bisexual individuals. The case 
involved a gay softball league that interrogated bisexual players with 
intrusive questions about their sexual orientation.51 Because of this 
questioning, the team with the bisexual players were forced to forfeit and  
stripped of their second-place finish in the world series.52 This is despite 
the explicit statement that the league was to promote the participation of 
bisexuals.53 The court ruled in favor of NAGAAA—on First Amendment 
freedom of association grounds—while avoiding the issue of how the 
NAGAAA essentially refused to recognize the existence of bisexual 
individuals by enforcing rules that labeled individuals as either 
heterosexual or homosexual.54 
Some cases have also exhibited gay and lesbian individuals presenting 
their legal arguments in a way that delegitimizes bisexuality. In United 
States v. Windsor,55 the plaintiff’s attorney made the strategic decision to 
use the terms “gay marriage,” “straight marriage,” “marriages of gay 
couples,” and “marriages of straight people.”56 This was reportedly based 
on the determination that those terms are more associated with being 
comfortable among gay and lesbian couples.57 However, when compared 
to the more accurate terms of “same-sex marriage” and “different-sex 
marriage,”58 the terminology used by the plaintiff’s attorney in Windsor. 
The plaintiff’s attorney is exposed for suggesting that there are only the 
binary groups of homosexual or heterosexual—thus ignoring the bisexual 
orientation.59 Furthermore, the plaintiff’s attorney in Windsor felt it 
necessary to point out that, despite Ms. Windsor being formerly married 
to a man, she is a lesbian.60 The problem with such a statement is the 
implication that if Ms. Windsor were bisexual, her right to same-sex 
marriage would somehow be limited or weakened.61 This strategy is likely 
 
51 Id. at 1159. 
52 Tweedy & Yescavage, supra note 30, at 711–12. 
53 Apilado, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1159. 
54 Tweedy & Yescavage, supra note 30, at 711–13. 
55 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
56 Tweedy & Yescavage, supra note 30, at 714. 
57 Id. 
58 The terms “same-sex marriage” and “different-sex marriage” are more accurate than 
the terms “gay marriage” and “straight marriage” because, technically, the issue in cases 
such as Windsor the issue is whether two people of the same sex can get married, not 
whether a person who is of the gay or lesbian sexual orientation can get married. 
59 Tweedy & Yescavage, supra note 30, at 714. 
60 Id. at 714–15. A similar occurrence happened in the California Proposition 8 case 
where the plaintiff’s attorney felt it necessary to point out that the plaintiff, Sandy Stier, 
was in fact a lesbian and not bisexual despite formerly being married to a man she claimed 
to love. Id. at 715. 
61 Id. at 715. This is not to say that the attorney representing Ms. Windsor is in any way 
bi-phobic herself. Given the bi-phobic climate—even among many who support to be 
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in part due to the fear that bisexuality challenges the immutability 
characteristic of homosexuality, which is integral to pro-same-sex 
marriage arguments.62 
In 2016 Judge Posner criticized a judge for demonstrating a lack of 
knowledge regarding the definition of bisexuality. “Apparently the 
immigration judge does not know the meaning of bisexual,”63 Judge 
Posner stated. Nevertheless, the very next year, Judge Posner defined 
bisexuality as someone who has “both homosexual and heterosexual 
orientations.”64 This definition is not only incorrect but harmful to the 
bisexual cause as it reinforces the harmful belief that there are only two 
sexual orientations and that those who identify as bisexual are simply 
confused as to which one of these binary options they fit into. 
Romer v. Evans65 serves as an excellent illustration as to how the law 
often overlooks those who identify as bisexual. The case involved a 
Colorado constitutional amendment that barred certain protections for 
“homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships.”66 However, in the majority decision, Justice Kennedy 
insisted on referring to the named class in the Colorado constitutional 
amendment as “homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.”67 
There is also evidence to suggest that bisexual individuals are 
discriminated against in the immigration and asylum context. In a 2016 
case, the Seventh Circuit was highly skeptical of a bisexual asylum 
seeker’s claim that he was the victim of violent discrimination, despite 
evidence supporting his claim.68 The immigration judge also appeared to 
be skeptical of even the existence of bisexuality.69 
 
LGBT supporters—this was likely a wise strategic decision for representing Ms. Windsor’s 
interests. But the need for such a strategy does point to how bisexuals are ignored in sexual 
orientation legal analysis. 
62 Id. at 716. 
63 Fuller v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 866, 879 (7th Cir. 2016). 
64 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 355 (7th Cir. 2017), (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
65 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
66 Id. at 620. 
67 Id. at 624 (“It prohibits all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state 
or local government designed to protect the named class, a class we shall refer to as 
homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.”). 
68 Fuller, 833 F.3d at 872 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
69 The immigration judge seemed to be confused by how the asylum seeker produced 
evidence of his former boyfriends while also being formerly married to a woman. Id. at 
873–74. 
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III. RELEVANT TITLE VII HISTORY 
In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.70 
Originally, the language of Title VII only included protections for 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, and national origin.71 
The addition of “sex” was later included on the final day of debate in the 
House in an effort to make the bill “so controversial that eventually it 
would be voted down . . ..”72 President Lyndon B. Johnson—whose 
administration had opposed the addition of “sex” to the legislation—
signed the bill into law after the longest continuous filibuster in Senate 
history.73 The text of Title VII does not explicitly make reference to sexual 
orientation or gender identity.74 It is unlikely that, in 1964, the legislature 
that passed Title VII intended for it to be applied to LGBT individuals—
especially considering that even the act of extending protections from 
gender discrimination was so controversial.75 While LGBT individuals 
continue to face unjust treatment in the twenty-first century, at the time the 
bill was passed, gay and lesbian individuals were considered “presumptive 
felons” and “literally, considered psychopaths, criminals, and enemies of 
the people.”76 
The history of Title VII adjudications is one of ever-increasing 
liberality. The causation requirement has been relaxed and lessened.77 The 
Act has been extended to include prohibitions on workplace sexual 
harassment78 and then to workplace racial and national origin 
 
70 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 
71 Turner, supra note 1, at 230. 
72 Charles Whalen & Barbara Whalen, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 116 (1985). 
73 Turner, supra note 1, at 235. 
74 What You Should Know, supra note 47 (“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
does not explicitly include sexual orientation or gender identity in its list of protected 
bases . . . .”). 
75 See Whalen & Whalen, supra note 72. 
76 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination 
Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 336, 333 (2017). 
77 Turner, supra note 1, at 236. (“Beginning in 1991, Title VII plaintiffs alleging status-
based (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) discrimination can satisfy a relaxed and 
lessened causation standard by ‘show[ing] that the motive to discriminate was one of the 
employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives which were 
causative in the employer’s decision.’”) (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. V. Nassar, 
570 U.S. 338, 343 (2013). 
78 Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 
8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 346 (1990) (“In all likelihood, the members of Congress 
would have been quite surprised to learn that they had contemplated including sexual 
harassment within the confines of sex discrimination—especially since the term ‘sexual 
harassment’ did not come into currency until the late 1970s.”). 
2020] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW 43 
 
harassment.79 The Act did not apply to associational race discrimination 
claims until the 1980s80 and not in associational gender discrimination 
claims until even more recently.81 The Act originally did not apply to 
educational institutions or state and local governments.82 The Act currently 
includes protections against pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex 
discrimination, but it was not originally interpreted to do so.83 In Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court extended Title VII “because 
of . . . sex” protections to victims of gender stereotyping.84 In 1998 the 
Supreme Court held that Title VII sex-based discrimination protections 
extend to same-sex harassment.85 The EEOC has long held that Title VII 
did not provide protections against sexual orientation discrimination86 but 
currently maintains that it does.87 In 2015 the EEOC released a 
memorandum stating that they “interpret[] and enforce[] Title VII’s 
prohibition of sex discrimination as forbidding any employment 
discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation.”88 
In 2015, the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Obergefell v. 
Hodges upheld the constitutional right to same sex marriage.89 This led to 
 
79 Turner, supra note 1, at 239. 
80 Andrew W. Powell, Is There a Future for Sex-Based Associational Discrimination 
Claims Under Title VII?, 66 LAB. L.J. 164, 165–66 (2015). 
81 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 125 (2d Cir. 2018) (“We now hold that 
the prohibition on associational discrimination applies with equal force to all the classes 
protected by Title VII, including sex.”). 
82 Carol Nackenoff, The Supreme Court Hears Arguments on the Meaning of “Sex 
Discrimination,” GENDER POL’Y REP. (Oct. 8, 2019), 
https://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/meaning-of-sex-discrimination/. 
83 Id. 
84 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). 
85 Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). 
86 Katherine Carter, Questioning the Definition of “Sex” in Title VII: Bostock v. Clayton 
County, GA, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 59, 72 (2020). 
87 Sex-Based Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2020) (“Discrimination 
against an individual because of . . . sexual orientation is discrimination because of sex in 
violation of Title VII.”). Although, note that Attorney General Jeff Sessions responded to 
this by claiming that “the EEOC is not speaking for the United States and its position about 
the scope of Title VII is entitled to no deference beyond its power to persuade.” Nackenoff, 
supra note 82. 
88 What You Should Know, supra note 47. However, relevant to the theme of this Article, 
the explanations provided by the EEOC as to how “sexual orientation” is protected under 
Title VII seem to focus on lesbian, gay, and transgender individuals while omitting 
protections for bisexual individuals. In the section “Examples of LGBT-Related Sex 
Discrimination Claims,” multiple examples are provided for transgender discrimination. 
Also, “Denying an employee a promotion because he is gay or straight” is also provided. 
Id. But no explicit example of how Title VII protections apply to bisexual individuals is 
provided. See id. 
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the Seventh Circuit pointing out in a Title VII discrimination case 
involving a lesbian woman that “[Obergefell] creates a paradoxical legal 
landscape in which a person can be married on Saturday and then fired on 
Monday for just that act.”90 
There is a current circuit split among federal appeals courts on this 
issue.91 Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia expressly prohibit 
sexual orientation discrimination.92 This is a hotly contested issue because 
many states still have no legislation against sexual orientation employment 
discrimination.93 In these states, Title VII is the only available safeguard 
against sexual orientation discrimination.94 
IV. DISCRIMINATION “BECAUSE OF . . . SEX”95 
One of the three main arguments presented in favor of including gay 
and lesbian individuals in Title VII employment discrimination protection 
claims is that the discrimination is ultimately because of sex.96 For 
purposes of potential application to bisexual individuals, it is important to 
distinguish the method by which this theory would protect gay and lesbian 
individuals from discrimination. It does not add sexual orientation to the 
statute’s enumerated protected classes of race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, “[o]bviously that lies 
beyond our power.”97 Rather, the courts that have interpreted Title VII’s 
“because of . . . sex” provision to protect gay and lesbian claimants from 
employment discrimination have done so by viewing their mistreatment 
as a form of sex discrimination. This is consistent with the EEOC’s 
position that, in federal employment, their decisions regarding extending 
Title VII protections to LGBT individuals does not involve “recogniz[ing] 
any new protected characteristics under Title VII. Rather [the EEOC] has 
 
90 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hively v. 
Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 830 F.3d 698, 714 (7th Cir. 2016)). 
91 The Eleventh Circuit held in Bostock that sexual-orientation discrimination does not 
constitute sex discrimination. Both the Seventh Circuit and Second Circuit held that it does 
in Hively and Zarda, respectively. 
92 Carter, supra note 86, at 59. 
93 Susan Miller, ‘Shocking’ Numbers: Half of LGBTQ Adults Live in States Where No 




95 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
96 Garrett Epps, Why ‘Because of Sex’ Should Protect Gay People, ATLANTIC (Sept. 26, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/title-vii-should-protect-gay-
people/598825/. 
97 Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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applied existing Title VII precedents to sex discrimination claims raised 
by LGBT individuals.”98 
This distinction may not be highly relevant to gay and lesbian 
individuals who have been discriminated against, since the end result is 
the same—the presence or absence of a legal recourse. However, for 
bisexual individuals this distinction could ultimately result in no 
protection at all. Adding “sexual orientation” to the enumerated list of 
protected classifications would clearly provide protections for bisexual 
individuals. But it is not clear that the reliance on a theory of 
discrimination “because of . . . sex” will result in the same protections. 
The standard argument for protecting gay and lesbian individuals from 
discrimination under Title VII involves considering the employer’s likely 
response to the same actions if performed by an employee of the opposite 
sex. As the petitioner’s attorney in Bostock summarized in her first 
sentence at oral argument, “[w]hen an employer fires a male employee for 
dating men but does not fire a female employee who dates men, he violates 
Title VII.”99 For example, if Bostock—a gay man who was fired for being 
sexually attracted to men—would have been female and sexually attracted 
to men, there would have been no firing. Therefore, Bostock’s firing was 
literally “because of . . . sex.” 
However, the gender discrimination that is so obvious in Bostock is 
less clear when applied to a similarly situated bisexual individual. This is 
because considering the gender of a bisexual employee would not 
necessarily lead to different behavior on the part of the employer. Consider 
the previous rationale for why firing a gay male employee is sex 
discrimination. It was because a female employee who engaged in the 
exact same behavior would not be fired. But an employer could likely 
maintain that if the gender of a male bisexual employee who was fired 
were switched to female, this would equally lead to a firing. In this way, 
even if the Supreme Court holds that Bostock was a victim of gender 
discrimination and therefore protected under Title VII, courts could 
nevertheless maintain that bisexual employment discrimination is not 
protected under Title VII. 
Note that this hypothetical employer who presents the defense that he 
equally discriminates against male and female bisexual employees is 
distinct from the argument provided by the employer in Zarda: that an 
employer who fires gay men and lesbian women alike cannot be said to be 
discriminating on the basis of sex because “[n]either sex is favored over 
 
98 What You Should Know, supra note 47. 
99 Oral Argument, supra note 4, at 0:15. 
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the other.”100 This latter line of reasoning is easily refuted because the 
sexual partners of a gay man and a lesbian woman are different. Namely, 
the former are male and the latter are female. Thus, this argument provided 
by the employer in Zarda would not negate the claim that he is engaging 
in gender discrimination. This employer is simply providing an additional 
example of how he would also unlawfully discriminate against a lesbian 
woman.101 However, with the bisexual male employee, the sexual partners 
would be indistinguishable—by gender—with those of a bisexual female 
employee. 
A similar argument from the petitioners in Bostock involves the act of 
defining “homosexual.” The petitioner’s brief in Bostock argues that one 
cannot define “homosexual” without first taking into account an 
individual’s sex.102 Webster’s dictionary defines “homosexual” as “of, 
relating to, or characterized by a tendency to direct sexual desire toward 
another of the same sex.”103 Therefore, in order to categorize someone as 
homosexual, one must first take into consideration his or her sex. 
However, “bisexual” is defined as “of, relating to, or characterized by a 
tendency to be sexually attracted toward individuals of both sexes . . . .”104 
While this definition of “bisexual” does refer to sex, it is not in the same 
context as the definition of “homosexual.” Namely, one is not required to 
know the sex of the individual to accurately identify him or her as bisexual. 
It is enough to know that the individual is sexually attracted to males and 
females. Conversely, if one only knows that someone is attracted to males, 
one must ascertain that person’s sex before being able to identify the 
individual as homosexual. 
V. GENDER STEREOTYPING DISCRIMINATION 
The second theory offered to extend Title VII protections to gay and 
lesbian individuals from employment discrimination is that the practice 
ultimately functions as a form of gender stereotyping discrimination. In 
the 1982 case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that 
 
100 Brief for Petitioners Altitude Express, Inc., and Ray Maynard at 9, Altitude Express, 
Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-623 (U.S. Aug. 16, 2019). 
101 Much like it is no defense for an employer to point out that his discrimination against 
a white employee married to a black person is not racial discrimination because the 
employer would also discriminate against a black employee married to a white person. This 
employer has ironically stated his intention to engage in more racial discrimination in an 
attempt to argue his original racial discrimination was something other than racial 
discrimination. 
102 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 13–14. 
103 Id. at 13. 
104 Bisexual, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bisex
ual (last visited Mar. 6, 2020). 
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gender stereotyping violated Title VII protections.105 The case involved a 
female employee who was denied a promotion because she was, among 
other things, too “macho.”106 Using language highly relevant to gay 
plaintiffs such as Bostock, the Court in Price Waterhouse explained the 
requirement of the causal relationship between the employer’s gender 
stereotyping and the employee’s harm: 
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment 
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the 
decision what its reasons were . . . one of those reasons would be that the 
applicant or employee was a woman. In the specific context of sex 
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman 
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of 
gender.107 
Later in the opinion, the Court more succinctly summed up the issue 
as, “in sex-based terms would [the employer] have criticized her as sharply 
(or criticized her at all) if she had been a man.”108 It is easy to see how this 
Price Waterhouse standard could lead to the conclusion that 
discrimination against a gay male employee is a form of gender 
stereotyping—the stereotype that males should be in romantic 
relationships with females—and therefore violate Title VII’s protection 
against gender discrimination. However, it is harder to see how this 
standard would lead to Title VII protections against a similarly situated 
bisexual employee. An employer who fired a male, bisexual employee 
solely because he was bisexual could potentially pass the Price 
Waterhouse standard. As such, the employer’s actions would not 
necessarily involve the practice of gender stereotyping.109 
A claim of gender stereotyping by a bisexual plaintiff is further 
complicated when one considers the subjective practice of considering 
behavior to be stereotypically “gay” or “bisexual.” In Prowel v. Wise 
Business Forms, Inc., the court recognized that Prowel, a gay man, was 
harmed because he demonstrated numerous gay stereotypes.110 These 
included speaking with a high voice, walking femininely, sitting “the way 
a woman would sit,” wearing “dressy clothes,” and pressing buttons on a 
 
105 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). 
106 Id. at 235 (plurality opinion). 
107 Id. at 250. 
108 Id. at 258. 
109 An employer who attempts to defend himself by saying that he would discriminate 
against male and female bisexuals equally is separate and distinct from the employer in 
Zarda who attempts to use the defense that he would discriminate against gay and lesbian 
employees equally. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 100; see also supra note 101, and 
accompanying text. 
110 579 F.3d 285, 287 (3rd Cir. 2009). 
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piece of machinery “with pizzazz.”111 The plaintiff received protection 
because the court was able to ascertain that these behaviors are generally 
identified as stereotypically “gay.”112 However, stereotypical bisexual 
behavior is less universally agreed upon—and therefore bisexual 
individuals would be less likely to receive protections from courts under 
this theory. 
This is not to say a Supreme Court holding that gay and lesbian 
employees receive Title VII protections on a theory of gender stereotype 
discrimination would be detrimental to bisexual advocates. Such a 
Supreme Court holding would just not necessarily apply to a similarly 
situated bisexual employee. It would still be a significant step toward 
bisexual individuals receiving Title VII protections. In the event of such a 
Supreme Court ruling, advocates could attempt to analogize the gender 
stereotypes involved in bisexual discrimination to those involved in gay 
and lesbian discrimination. As the district court pointed out in Zarda—a 
case involving a gay male employee—”[t]he gender stereotype at work 
here is that ‘real’ men should date women, and not other men.”113 While 
bisexual men do not violate this gender stereotype to the extent that a gay 
man does—bisexual men do conform to the first part of dating women—
they do violate the second part of the stereotype by dating men. Therefore, 
a future case involving a male bisexual plaintiff could attempt to isolate 
the issue to his intimate relationship with men. After all, the male partners 
are likely the sole reason for the discrimination since without them the 
male employee would be left with only female partners. In this way, a 
Supreme Court precedent applying Title VII protections to gay and lesbian 
individuals on a gender stereotyping theory would not necessarily be 
interpreted to apply protections to bisexual individuals, but it would 
provide beneficial case law that currently does not exist. 
VI. ASSOCIATIONAL DISCRIMINATION 
The third and final theory offered to extend Title VII employment 
protections to gay and lesbian individuals is that of associational 
discrimination. Associational discrimination occurs when someone is 
discriminated against due to his association or relationship to a third 
person who the employer disapproves of.114 The text of Title VII “contains 
 
111 Id. 
112 The issue of how gay and lesbian individuals who demonstrate stereotypical behavior 
are more likely to be protected under Title VII and the harm that comes from perpetuating 
stereotypes are beyond the scope of this paper. 
113 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 121 (2d Cir. 2018). 
114 Powell, supra note 80, at 165. 
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no express prohibition against associational discrimination . . . .”115 
However, associational discrimination claims began to be read into Title 
VII by the courts in the 1980s.116 Initially these claims were mostly limited 
to associations based on race,117 but in the 2018 case of Zarda, the district 
court held that protection from associational discrimination applies to all 
the enumerated classes in Title VII.118 
In associational discrimination cases, the employee (associator) is not 
viewed as being harmed because of the employer’s animosity toward his 
own characteristics.119 Rather, it is the characteristics of the third party he 
is associating with that the employer has animosity toward, and therefore 
results in harm to the employee.120 This standard likely results in a bisexual 
individual having a more difficult time than a gay or lesbian person in 
prevailing on a Title VII associational discrimination claim. To illustrate, 
imagine the following two discriminatory actions involving a gay 
employee and a bisexual employee: 
(1) The employer fires George, a gay employee, solely because 
George is gay. 
(2) The employer fires Brett, a bisexual employee, solely because 
Brett is bisexual. 
George could make an associational discrimination case that he was 
fired because of the employer’s animosity toward the gender of his sexual 
partners. Namely, if George’s sexual partners were female, he would not 
have been fired. It was only because they were male that George was fired. 
However, a similar associational discrimination claim by Brett would 
not be so clear. Note that in George’s example the employer’s animosity 
toward the third party is not considered to be based on the third party’s 
sexual orientation. Rather, it is considered to be based on the third party’s 
gender. However, in Brett’s case the employer could claim that it was not 
the gender of any individual third party that was the cause of the firing. 
Rather, it was the act of Brett engaging in sexual relationships with both 
males and females. In other words, if the Supreme Court extends Title VII 
protections to gay and lesbian individuals based on a theory of gender-
 
115 Thomas Johnson and Betina Miranda, The Company You Keep: Associational 
Discrimination, LAW 360 (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/73829/the-
company-you-keep-associational-discrimination. 
116 Powell, supra note 80, at 165–66. 
117 This most frequently manifests in an employee being harmed due to the race of his or 
her spouse, children, or close friends. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
118 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 125 (2d Cir. 2018) (“We now hold that 
the prohibition on associational discrimination applies with equal force to all the classes 
protected by Title VII, including sex.”). 
119 Powell, supra note 80, at 165. 
120 Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 512 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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based associational discrimination, the same logic would not necessarily 
protect bisexual individuals. Brett’s employer could claim that he has no 
issue with a male employee having intimate relationships with either 
males or females. The bisexual practice of having intimate relationships 
with both males and females that is the issue—and thus Brett was 
discriminated against based on his sexual orientation and not based on the 
gender of his romantic partners. The third party in an associational 
discrimination cause of action must be a part of a specifically enumerated 
“protected class,” such as race or sex.121 Sexual orientation is not one of 
the enumerated protected classes. 
In such a case, Brett’s best associational discrimination argument 
would likely involve parsing out his sexual partners and focusing solely 
on the males. In this way he could claim that his employer is showing 
animosity toward these male partners on the basis of their gender. After 
all, if those men were women—and therefore all of Brett’s sexual partners 
were women—the employer would not have fired Brett. But this produces 
a more convoluted associational discrimination argument than the one 
available to George. Based on current jurisprudence, George’s more 
straightforward argument already stretches Title VII protections further 
than the Supreme Court has allowed. While Brett’s argument is not a giant 
leap from George’s, it is far from the language of Title VII, which does 
not even explicitly allow associational discrimination claims on any 
grounds.122 
The issue for Brett could become even more difficult to prevail on if 
he were bisexual but—during the time of his employment—only engaged 
in intimate relationships with females, or did not engage in any intimate 
relationships at all. If Brett was fired for being bisexual, it is even more 
clear that it was only because of his bisexuality and not because of any 
characteristic of his partner(s). In this scenario, there is a complete lack of 
any association whereby an associative discrimination claim could be 
rooted. 
The good news for bisexual rights advocates is that there is a clear 
trend in district courts extending the scope of associational discrimination 
claims. Originally this cause of action was not available in any cases.123 
Then, it only applied in race-based cases.124 In 2007 the idea of gender-
based associational discrimination was “a novel theory.”125 In 2009 it 
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“[lacked] precedential support.”126 In 2010 it was “an unsettled legal 
question,”127 and in 2018 the Second Circuit held that it “applied with 
equal force to all the classes protected by Title VII.”128 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Many legal scholars view the LGBTQ+ community as a conglomerate 
where a Supreme Court victory providing employment protections from 
discrimination for some would necessarily provide protections for all. As 
demonstrated in this Article, that is not necessarily accurate. The three 
arguments for extending Title VII gender protections to gay and lesbian 
individuals do not perfectly translate to protections for bisexual 
individuals. Compared to a case involving discrimination against a gay or 
lesbian employee, it is a more tenuous connection to show that 
discrimination against a bisexual employee was “because of . . . sex.” 
Likewise, it would be more difficult for a bisexual employee to show that 
he was discriminated against based on gender stereotyping than a gay or 
lesbian employee. Finally, the nature of associational discrimination 
claims results in that theory more easily applying to a gay or lesbian 
employee than a bisexual employee. 
A Supreme Court win for the petitioners in Bostock would still be good 
for bisexual advocates. But it is far from clear that it would automatically 
provide the same protections for bisexual individuals as it would for gay 
and lesbian individuals. The petitioner’s attorney in Bostock even 
explicitly stated that Title VII should not “encompass sexual orientation 
discrimination”129 and instead provided a gender-based rationale that does 
not necessarily apply to bisexual individuals.130 How the Court crafts its 
opinion in Bostock could provide clues as to how bisexual advocates 
should move forward to secure the protections enjoyed by gay and lesbian 
individuals. No matter what the outcome in Bostock and future LGBT 
cases, it is important not to engage in the practice of bisexual erasure 
analyzed in this Article by neglecting to consider how legal outcomes will 
affect the bisexual community specifically. 
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